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CONFIDENCE SCHEMES: THEFT LOSS 
DEDUCTIONS, RESTITUTION, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 
STEVEN F. FRIEDELL† 
INTRODUCTION 
May courts legitimately impose their public policy views to 
override statutory commands?  For example, if a taxpayer is 
tricked into giving money to thieves in the mistaken belief that 
they are helping him purchase counterfeit money, may courts 
deny the taxpayer a loss for theft that is allowed by statute?  
Similarly, even though the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) allows 
a deduction for casualty losses, may courts disallow a deduction 
for a lost truck when the driver contributed to the accident by 
speeding and by driving while intoxicated?  Problems of this kind 
also arise outside the income tax context.  For example, may 
courts deny tort relief to a person who is injured while 
committing a criminal act even though the pertinent comparative 
fault statute apparently allows partial recovery?  Even if a 
legislature expected courts to exercise judgment in these matters, 
how are judges to know where to draw the line? 
This Article focuses on some of these problems in the field of 
federal income tax.  It suggests that when part of the IRC 
appears to direct a particular outcome, courts are prone to error 
when they override that command by imposing a penalty based 
on the judges’ moral condemnation of a party’s behavior.  It 
would be better for courts to employ the statute’s intrinsic set of 
public policies to guide their decision making.  In some instances, 
the results will not change because of other overlooked provisions  
 
 
† Professor, Rutgers Law School. My thanks to Jay Feinman and Doug Kahn for 
their helpful comments and to Rutgers law librarian David Batista for valuable 
assistance. 
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in the statute.  However, adherence to the legislature’s balance of 
conflicting interests will likely lead to greater coherence and 
more consistent application of state policies. 
Part I of this Article focuses on theft losses suffered by 
confidence-scheme victims who thought they would profit from 
counterfeiting or other illegal activity.  Courts usually disallow 
these deductions so as to discourage illegal activity.  This Article 
criticizes such a rationale and suggests instead that a tax 
deduction would be contrary to state policy in those situations 
where states in effect penalize victims by denying them 
restitution from the thieves.  Part II discusses the cases that 
have denied deductions for fines and civil penalties, and explores 
how these apply to the denial of restitution.  Part III assesses the 
wisdom of disallowing deductions in these cases and suggests 
that it would make more sense for society to punish the 
wrongdoer solely in the criminal courts and to allow the would-be 
counterfeiter a theft loss deduction. 
I. TRYING TO “MAKE” MONEY AND OTHER WAYS OF LOSING IT 
Some con men convinced Vernon Blick that they had a 
machine that could reproduce money.1  The machine was 
“nothing more than a tin box with a buzzer.”2  Blick convinced his 
employer, Raymond Mazzei, to invest in the scheme, and the two 
went together to meet with the con men, bringing large amounts 
of money in one hundred dollar bills.3  While engaged in the 
process of copying the bills, two armed men impersonating police 
held Mazzei and Blick at gunpoint and placed handcuffs on one of 
the con men.4  Mazzei managed to escape, and the two 
“policemen” and the con men left with the money.5  In the 
scheme, Mazzei lost twenty thousand dollars and Blick lost five 
thousand dollars.6  Mazzei and Blick reported the incident to law 
enforcement.7 
1 Mazzei v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 497, 498 (1974). 
2 Mazzei, 61 T.C. at 500. See MARIA KONNIKOVA, THE CONFIDENCE GAME: WHY 
WE FALL FOR IT . . . EVERY TIME (2016), for an account of confidence schemes and 
the psychological makeup of con artists and their victims. 
3 Mazzei, 61 T.C. at 498–99. 
4 Id. at 499–500. 
5 Id. at 500. 
6 Id. at 499. 
7 Id. at 500. 
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Mazzei claimed a theft loss and argued that it was deductible 
under IRC § 165(c)(2) or (c)(3).8  With five judges dissenting, the 
United States Tax Court ruled that the loss was nondeductible as 
against public policy.9  There were three opinions favoring the 
Internal Revenue Service, all based on the idea that 
counterfeiting was against public policy or that Mazzei had 
conspired with Blick in violation of the law.10  The two dissenting 
opinions argued that allowing a deduction would not encourage 
counterfeiting, and Mazzei and Blick, despite their evil intent, 
could not counterfeit money on their own.11 
Mazzei v. Commissioner12 is the leading case standing for the 
proposition that losses under § 165 can be disallowed on public 
policy grounds.13  Mazzei is part of a line of cases where 
taxpayers have been denied loss deductions for thefts resulting 
from schemes to counterfeit money,14 or to buy stolen money.15  A 
split decision that went the other way, Edwards v. Bromberg16 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 502. 
10 Id.; Id. at 502–03 (Dawson, J., concurring); Id. at 504 (Tannenwald, J., 
concurring). 
11 Id. at 504–05 (Featherston, J., dissenting) (arguing that Mazzei and Blick did 
not conspire with the con men to counterfeit money because the con men’s only 
intention was to steal); Id. at 506–07 (Sterrett, J., dissenting). 
12 61 T.C. 497 (1974). 
13 E.g., Bilzerian v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 134, 139 n.6 (1998); Blackman v. 
Comm’r, 88 T.C. 677, 680–81 (1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1988); Rev. Rul. 81-
24, 1981-1 C.B. 79; Chief Counsel Advisory, I.R.S. C.C.A. 200451030, 2014 WL 
2915913 (Dec. 17, 2004); MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 16.07[5] (Thomson Reuters ed., 2015); 
7 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 28:155 (2015); cf. DOUGLAS A. 
KAHN & JEFFREY H. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE ¶ 24.1200, at 573 (7th ed. 2016) (“It is possible that the 
public policy exception continues to apply to deductions allowed for losses . . . .”). But 
see Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 1637, 1707 n.146 (1998) (criticizing Mazzei’s use of moral belief to decide 
technical legal issue). 
14 See, e.g., Richey v. Comm’r, 33 T.C. 272, 276–77 (1959). Richey gave $15,000 
to Johnson believing that the money would be used to make counterfeit bills; 
Johnson took the money and did not return. Id. at 273. 
15 See, e.g., Lincoln v. Comm’r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 185 (1985). Lincoln gave a 
briefcase containing $140,000 to a man at a train station who was to give him in 
exchange between $600,000 and $1,000,000 of “stolen money.” Id. The man went to 
another part of the station, supposedly to count the money. Two policemen staged a  
fake arrest of the other man, and Lincoln fled to avoid arrest. Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 
81-24, 1981-1 C.B. 79 (determining that public policy precludes a deduction under 
IRC § 165(c) for losses incurred by those who burn down their own building). 
16 232 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956). 
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involved a taxpayer swindled out of money he mistakenly 
thought would be bet on a fixed race.17  The promoter of the 
scheme embezzled the taxpayer’s money and was later 
prosecuted for failure to report the income.18  The majority 
dismissed the public policy argument on the grounds that there 
was in fact no fixed race and that it would be “Pecksniffian” to 
deny the taxpayer a deduction when the promoter of the scheme 
was taxed on the money he embezzled.19  The dissent argued that 
having tried to defraud others, the taxpayer “is in no position to 
call on the Government to bear a part of his loss.”20  None of the 
opinions in Mazzei could distinguish Bromberg; the majority did 
not “feel constrained to follow” it,21 and the dissenters thought it 
controlled.22  This Article suggests that these cases can be 
reconciled.23 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Mazzei disagree on 
whether the taxpayer’s loss had a “direct relationship” to the 
illegal act and whether allowing the deduction would severely 
and immediately frustrate a sharply defined governmental 
policy.24  These tests were derived from several United States 
Supreme Court opinions, and their respective  histories reveal 
their inherent weaknesses. 
In a 1943 decision, Commissioner v. Heininger,25 the 
taxpayer was engaged in a mail order business selling false 
teeth, and the Postmaster General determined that the 
taxpayer’s advertisements were false or misleading.26  The Court 
allowed a business deduction for the taxpayer’s attorney fees and 
other legal costs unsuccessfully opposing the Postmaster 
General’s fraud order.27  The Court found that the attorney fees 
and legal expenses were ordinary and necessary business 
expenses and that a deduction for them would not frustrate 
17 Id. at 109–10. 
18 Id. at 111. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 111–12 (Rives, J., dissenting). 
21 Mazzei v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 497, 502 (1974); see Lincoln v. Comm’r, 50 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 185 n.2 (1985). 
22 Mazzei, 61 T.C. at 505 (Featherston, J., dissenting); id. at 506 (Sterrett, J., 
dissenting). 
23 See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
24 Compare Mazzei, 61 T.C. at 502, with id. at 506–07 (Sterrett, J., dissenting). 
25 320 U.S. 467 (1943). 
26 Id. at 469. 
27 Id. at 474–75. 
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sharply defined national or state policies.28  The expenses bore 
only a “remote relation to an illegal act.”29  Moreover, the statute 
authorizing the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders was 
intended to protect the public—not to punish violators or to deter 
accused violators from hiring lawyers to make a bona fide 
defense.30  A separate criminal statute punished violators.31 
Fifteen years later, in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. 
Commissioner,32 the Court disallowed deductions for fines paid by 
several states for violating their maximum weight laws, a result 
codified a few years later in IRC § 162(f).33  The Court held: 
[T]he test of nondeductibility always is the severity and 
immediacy of the frustration resulting from allowance of the 
deduction.  The flexibility of such a standard is necessary if we 
are to accommodate both the congressional intent to tax only 
net income, and the presumption against congressional intent to 
encourage violation of declared public policy. 
Certainly the frustration of state policy is most complete and 
direct when the expenditure for which deduction is sought is 
itself prohibited by statute.  If the expenditure is not itself an 
illegal act, but rather the payment of a penalty imposed by the 
State because of such an act, as in the present case, the 
frustration attendant upon deduction would be only slightly less 
remote, and would clearly fall within the line of disallowance.  
Deduction of fines and penalties uniformly has been held to 
frustrate state policy in severe and direct fashion by reducing 
the “sting” of the penalty prescribed by the state legislature.34 
The Court thus established a hierarchy of expenses that 
frustrated governmental policy.  Expenses that violate a statute 
are most direct; fines and penalties are a close second.  However, 
the Court decided Commissioner v. Sullivan35 the same day as 
Tank Truck Rentals, thus allowing the deduction of rent and 
wages paid to employees engaged in bookmaking, even though 
the payment of rent violated state law and the employees acted 
28 See id. at 475. 
29 Id. at 474. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 356 U.S. 30 (1958). 
33 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(f) (West 2014); Tank Truck Rentals, 356 U.S. at 31–32. 
34 Id. at 35–36 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
35 356 U.S. 27 (1958). 
FINAL _FRIEDELL 8/25/2016  11:06 AM 
30 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:25   
in violation of state law.36  The Court did not attempt to reconcile 
these two cases, and Congress apparently overturned Sullivan in 
1971 by revising IRC § 162(c)(2), which, among other things, 
disallows deductions for certain payments that are illegal under 
state law if the law is generally enforced.37 
The Heininger court noted, with apparent approval, that 
courts had ruled that taxpayers convicted of crimes are not 
allowed to deduct attorney fees associated with their criminal 
defense.38  However, in 1966, the Court held, in Commissioner v. 
Tellier,39 that a taxpayer is allowed a business deduction for legal 
expenses incurred in the unsuccessful defense of a criminal 
prosecution.40  Further, the Court concluded, “[W]e can find no 
warrant for attaching to [the severe punishment imposed on the 
taxpayer] an additional financial burden that Congress has 
neither expressly nor implicitly directed.”41 
Despite the Court’s reasoning, it is not obvious that the 
deductions allowed in Heininger and Tellier do not frustrate 
governmental policies.  Part of the cost of illegal activity is the 
expense of defending against prosecution.  In Burroughs 
Building Material Co. v. Commissioner,42 Judge Augustus Hand 
wrote, “If the fines and costs cannot be deducted, the legal 
expenses incurred in litigating the question whether the 
taxpayers violated the law and whether fines should be imposed 
should naturally fall with the fines themselves.”43  He stressed 
that criminals who employ lawyers in their unsuccessful defense 
36 Id. at 28. The Tax Court found that the payment of wages was also a violation 
of state law. Mesi v. Comm’r, 25 T.C. 513, 522 (1955), rev'd in part, 242 F.2d 558 
(7th Cir. 1957), aff'd sub nom. Comm’r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958). 
37 Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178 § 310, 85 Stat. 497, 525. For criticism 
of § 162(c), see Douglas A. Kahn & Howard Bromberg, Provisions Denying a 
Deduction for Illegal Expenses and Expenses of an Illegal Business Should be 
Repealed, 18 FLA. TAX REV. 207 (2016). The authors distinguish the tax treatment of 
fines and penalties under § 162(f), as a deduction for these items would reduce the 
sanction and deterrent. 
38 Comm’r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 n.8. (1943). 
39 383 U.S. 687 (1966). 
40 Id. at 694. 
41 Id. at 694–95 (footnote omitted). 
42 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931). 
43 Id. at 180. Burroughs was cited with apparent approval in Heininger, 320 
U.S. at 473 n.8. See also Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Comm’r, 175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 
1949); Helvering v. Superior Wines & Liquors, Inc., 134 F.2d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 
1943); Nat’l Outdoor Advert. Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878, 881 (2d Cir. 
1937). 
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were obdurate and “added impenitence to their offence.”44  Going 
further, in the first reported decision on this issue, the Board of 
Tax Appeals denied a deduction for successful defense of a charge 
of perjury in connection with a charge of bribery of a labor 
leader.45  The Board concluded that bribery and perjury were not 
ordinary and necessary acts, and that it would be against public 
policy to recognize the defense costs as legitimate.46  Even though 
the taxpayer was not convicted of perjury, the Board determined 
that laying oneself open to charge of perjury was also not an 
ordinary and necessary activity.47 
The Supreme Court cases discussed above demonstrate the 
potential inconsistency and fluidity inherent in the task of 
determining whether a deduction would directly and severely 
frustrate an important government policy.48  The best that can be 
said for the test is that it is flexible, but fails to give taxpayers an 
adequate means to predict whether a particular expense will be 
deductible or not.49  The test bears an uncanny resemblance to 
that bête noire of tort law, proximate cause, and shares some of 
its drawbacks.  In the latter context, it is useful to remember the 
observation by a nineteenth-century scholar, “When a court say 
this damage is remote, it does not flow naturally, it is not  
 
44 Jerry Rossman Corp., 175 F.2d at 713. 
45 Appeal of Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214, 217 (1924). 
46 Id. at 217. 
47 Id. 
48 For a parallel development in England, compare McKnight v. Sheppard, 
[1999] 1 W.L.R. 1333 (HL) at 1338 (appeal taken from Eng.) (allowing deduction of 
legal expenses) with Comm’rs of Inland Revenue v. Alexander von Glehn & Co., Ld., 
[1920] 2 K.B. 553 (AC) at 566 (appeal taken from Eng.) (denying deduction for fines 
and legal expenses). 
49 Part of the difficulty is defining the public policy that is at stake. If, as 
asserted in Heininger, it were merely to punish those convicted of crimes after 
assuring the defendants of “constitutional and statutory safeguards appropriate to 
trial for a crime,” then a deduction for legal expenses would seem appropriate. 
Comm’r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 474 (1943). However, if the criminal laws were 
designed in part “[t]o foster the development of personal capacity for responsible 
decision to the end that every individual may realize his potentialities as a 
participating and contributing member of his community,” then allowing the 
deduction would be contrary to public policy. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the 
Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 440 (1958); see also United States v. 
Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 105 (1972) (concluding the concept of proximate cause “has 
little place in tax law where plural aspects are not usual, where an item either is or 
is not a deduction, or either is or is not a business bad debt, and where certainty is 
desirable”). 
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proximate; all they mean, and all they can mean, is, that under 
all the circumstances they think the plaintiff should not 
recover.”50 
In deciding whether to allow a deduction in cases like 
Mazzei, we will gain little by mulling over whether the taxpayer’s 
illegal acts were directly or indirectly related to the loss.  Courts 
have learned that such a test in the torts area is vague, 
amorphous, and invites undesired results.51  We have no means 
for measuring how direct an illegal act is to a loss.  We can, 
however, ask whether the illegal act was one of a great many 
but-for causes of the loss.  That is, we can determine whether the 
loss would probably have occurred even if the taxpayer had 
changed his behavior to the minimal extent necessary to comply 
with the law.52  For example, Mazzei’s illegal act was one of the 
but-for causes of his loss.  If Mazzei had acted legally and not 
sought to make counterfeit money, he would not have incurred a 
loss.  It is another matter to ask whether that illegal act directly 
or indirectly contributed to his loss.  Such a question merely 
invites a value judgment as to whether we think the taxpayer 
should be allowed a deduction. 
In some situations, the use of the direct/indirect analysis 
only works to obscure the problem.  If a taxpayer builds a house 
without obtaining building permits and a large forest fire burns 
everything in its path and destroys the house, the IRS will allow 
a loss deduction.53  The Chief Counsel recognized, “[T]he loss 
would have occurred regardless of whether Taxpayers had 
obtained the required permits.”54  The Chief Counsel’s further 
observation that “the casualty loss was not directly related to 
Taxpayers’ failure to obtain permits”55 adds only confusion to the 
50 Nicholas St. John Green, Torts Under French Law, 8 AM. L. REV. 508, 519 
(1874). 
51 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. e (AM. 
LAW. INST. 2010). 
52 See David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
1765, 1768–73 (1997) (explaining that to determine whether a party’s negligence 
was a cause-in-fact of the injury, one must create a counter-factual hypothesis and 
correct the wrongful conduct “to the minimal extent necessary to make it conform to 
the law’s requirements,” and then ask whether the harm would probably still have 
occurred). 
53 Chief Counsel Advisory, I.R.S. C.C.A. 201346009, 2013 WL 6137595 (Nov. 15, 
2013). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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analysis.  A more challenging case would arise if complying with 
the building code requirements might have prevented the house 
from being destroyed.  Similarly, the Tax Court allowed a 
taxpayer to take a casualty-loss deduction for damage to his 
truck that occurred while the taxpayer was driving under the 
influence of alcohol.56  The court held, “In addition, there was no 
evidence that excess speed or alcohol directly caused petitioner’s 
accident.”57  The directness or indirectness of the speed and 
alcohol were not the issue.  The truck slid off an embankment, 
but it was not shown that the loss would probably not have 
occurred had the taxpayer been sober.58  The opinion provides no 
guidance as to whether a deduction would be allowed if speeding 
or drunk driving had been a but-for cause of the accident. 
Nor does a court have the tools to measure whether the 
frustration of governmental policy is severe or merely moderate.  
If such tools existed, a court ought to allow partial deductions 
depending on the degree of frustration.  Moreover, the 
requirement that a deduction must not immediately frustrate 
governmental policy seems out of place.  If a deduction would 
sabotage an important government policy, would a court allow it 
even if the frustration would not occur right away?59  In seeking 
to apply these standards, the courts have instead made judgment 
calls based on their sense of social policy or morality.60 
56 Rohrs v. Comm’r, No. 14109-08S, Summ. Op. 2009-190, 2009 WL 4723327, at 
*4 (T.C. Dec. 10, 2009). 
57 Id. at *3. 
58 Id. at *1–3. The driver’s blood-alcohol level was just slightly over the legal 
limit. Id. at *2. 
59 A similar problem occurs in Jewish law. According to some rabbis, a 
defendant is not liable for harm caused by a wrongful act unless the harm occurs 
immediately. In applying this rule, however, rabbis engaged in the fiction that some 
injuries were deemed to occur immediately even when the injury occurred sometime 
later. See Steven F. Friedell, Nobody’s Perfect: Proximate Cause in American and 
Jewish Law, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 125–28, 137–39 (2002). 
60 See Mazzei v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 497, 506 (1974) (Sterrett, J., dissenting) 
(stating that courts pay “lip service” to the Supreme Court by asserting a deduction 
would cause immediate and severe frustration to governmental policy without 
showing how that frustration will occur). In Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 
Judge Learned Hand wrote, “[T]here are ‘penalties’ and ‘penalties,’ and that some 
are deductible and some are not. . . . We hold therefore that in every case the 
question must be decided ad hoc.” 175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1949). Judge Hand 
found evidence that a deduction for paying the penalty for having innocently 
violated emergency price control regulations would not frustrate a governmental 
policy because the Price Control Administrator had accepted payment of the amount 
of the overcharge as sufficient and did not seek treble damages. Id. at 714. Further, 
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In cases like Mazzei, some judges conclude that denying a 
deduction would strike a blow against counterfeiting.61  This 
seems improbable since the victims in these cases were not 
counterfeiting—they only thought they were.62  This decision will 
not likely deter real counterfeiters nor cause those who 
mistakenly think they are counterfeiting to desist.63  A confidence 
scheme’s success depends on convincing the victims that they are 
going to win.64  If Mazzei thought there was a serious risk of 
being cheated, he would have withdrawn from the enterprise. 
The disallowance of a deduction may be justified by the 
common law rule of denying individuals defrauded in counterfeit 
money schemes, like Mazzei, the right to seek restitution.65  Such 
claims fail even though the thieves are unjustly enriched.  They 
fail due to the principle stated by Lord Mansfield that no court 
“will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an 
the regulations were “extraordinarily complicated and difficult to comprehend.” Id. 
The court recognized, however, that another way of looking at the matter would lead 
to the opposite conclusion. That is, one could argue that “the more unsparing and 
relentless was the pursuit of offenders, however innocent they may have been of any 
willful violation of the regulations, the more solicitous would they become to comply, 
and the more effective would be the enforcement of the Act” and that the taxpayer 
could have avoided the overcharges by “more appropriate accounting.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
61 Mazzei, 61 T.C. at 501 (citing Richey v. Comm’r, 33 T.C. 272, 276–77 (1959)); 
Lincoln v. Comm’r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 185 (1985) (finding that to allow a deduction 
would encourage attempts to buy stolen money). 
62 Mazzei, 61 T.C. at 507 (Sterrett, J., dissenting); accord 2 GEORGE E. PALMER, 
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 192 (1978) (arguing that, assuming the parties know the 
law, denial of restitution is just as likely to encourage participation by confidence 
scheme promoters). 
63 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 32 
cmt. d, illus. 11–12 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“The potential availability of a claim in 
restitution between thieves who have fallen out . . . will not—on any realistic 
appraisal—affect the decision to enter into the transaction, or undermine the 
deterrent effect of the criminal penalties to which both claimant and defendant are 
subject in any event.”); Andrew Kull, Restitution's Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
17, 32 (2003) (arguing that it is unlikely that lack of a remedy in restitution has any 
deterrent effect). Professor Kull was the Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment. 
64 See KONNIKOVA, supra note 2 at 235 (“From the confidence man’s perspective, 
this is the ideal moment to make a killing: pull the plug just when your mark is at 
his most convinced.”). 
65 See Chapman v. Haley, 80 S.W. 190, 191 (Ky. 1904). The plaintiff paid $300 
for $3,000 of “good money,” and the defendant took the money and never returned it. 
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, 
§ 32(3), cmt. d, illus. 13 (AM. LAW INST. 2011); 2 PALMER, supra note 62, at 188, 226. 
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immoral or an illegal act.”66  State courts have not ordered the 
defrauded party to pay a penalty, but the financial impact of 
denying restitution is the same as if they had.67  The common law 
rule expresses a governmental policy that defrauded parties have 
placed themselves outside the protection of the law by their 
criminal or immoral conduct.68  Although some judges claim that 
they deny relief solely “to preserve the integrity of the process,”69 
courts will order relief if they determine that the plaintiff was 
less at fault than the defendant.70  It would be wrong to think 
that the courts have simply failed to rule on the parties’ rights 
when the parties are equally at fault.71  The courts have 
established a rule of law that theft victims who attempt to 
participate in counterfeiting schemes cannot get their money 
back.  As the Reporter for the Third Restatement of Restitution 
has recognized, the denial of restitution is punitive, a form of 
retributive justice in that the defrauded parties forfeit their  
 
 
66 Holman v. Johnson (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (KB) 1121 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
67 If the victim of the confidence scheme were able to recover restitution from 
the thieves in the year of the theft, there would be nothing to deduct. Denial of 
restitution makes little practical difference when the thieves cannot be located or 
when they are judgment proof. But the lack of a civil remedy discourages the fraud 
victim from pursuing the thieves, and from the victim’s point of view, it is as if the 
law required that their investment in the confidence be forfeited. 
68 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 32(3), 
cmt. d, § 63, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011). Judge Rives, dissenting in Edwards v. 
Bromberg, made essentially this point. 232 F.2d 107, 111–12 (5th Cir. 1956) (Rives, 
J., dissenting). The Restatement describes this as a defense based on the plaintiff’s 
“inequitable” conduct that is available to both equitable and legal claims for 
restitution. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 63, 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011). The defense does not mean that the defendants have 
been justly enriched. Rather, “[T]he principle involved is in fact one of judicial 
forbearance, and its concern is with the disqualification of the claimant rather than 
the rightful position of the recipient.” Id. § 63, cmt. a. 
69 Soleimany v. Soleimany [1999] QB 785 at 800 (Eng.). 
70 2 PALMER, supra note 62, at 202. Courts have also allowed restitution if the 
plaintiff repented and if the illegal act has not been performed. Id. at 214. 
71 Cf. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 500, 515 (William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (arguing that a court fashions a rule of law when 
it denies a plaintiff a remedy because it thinks that it would be better for the 
legislature to rule on the matter). 
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entire investment.72  The denial of relief renders the money 
irretrievably lost, and a deduction for the loss would reduce this 
sanction. 
One happy consequence of this analysis is that one can 
reconcile Edwards v. Bromberg73 with Mazzei and the other 
counterfeiting case.  It will be recalled that in Bromberg, the 
court allowed a deduction for the losses suffered in a scheme 
where the taxpayer thought he was betting on fixed horse races.74  
This is consistent with the way courts handle restitution claims 
made by such victims.  In a series of cases, courts ordered 
restitution where a gang of thieves ran an elaborate confidence 
scheme to steal money from people who believed they were 
investing in fixed foot races.75  The courts said the investors were 
less at fault than the promoters.76  Since state law does not 
penalize these victims by denying restitution, a tax deduction for 
theft losses does not offend state policy. 
The next part of this Article suggests that the denial of 
restitution suffered by the defrauded taxpayer is a “fine or 
similar penalty paid to a government” within the meaning of 
IRC § 162(f).  If so, a court faced with a claim for theft loss under 
IRC § 165 arising from the taxpayer’s failed attempt to cheat the 
public does not need to speculate as to whether a deduction 
would encourage such acts.  The court does not need to look far to 
find a public policy justification for withholding a deduction.  It 
can be found in IRC § 162(f), which prohibits deducting fines and 
similar penalties as ordinary and necessary business expenses.77 
 
72 Kull, supra note 63, at 25–26, 32 (2003); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 63, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
73 232 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956). The Government argued that the taxpayer could 
not claim a loss deduction unless he had first shown that he had tried to obtain 
restitution from the thief. Id. at 111. The court rejected this argument. Id. 
74 Id. at 108–10. 
75 See Hobbs v. Boatright, 93 S.W. 934, 934–35 (Mo. 1906); see also Falkenberg 
v. Allen, 90 P. 415, 416–19 (Okla. 1907). 
76 See Stewart v. Wright, 147 F. 321, 322 (8th Cir. 1906); Falkenberg, 90 P. 415, 
416–17 (Okla.  1907) (victim demanded his money back before the race was held); see 
generally Hobbs, 93 S.W. 934 (Mo. 1906); Lockman v. Cobb, 91 S.W. 546 (Ark. 1905); 
see also PALMER supra note 62, at 204–05. 
77 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(f) (West 2014). 
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II. OF FINES, PENALTIES, AND “GOVERNMENTS” 
Section 162(f) of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) provides, 
“[n]o deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any fine 
or similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any 
law.”78  These few simple words have led to much litigation 
involving billions of dollars of potential tax liabilities.79 
Although § 162(f) only applies to disallow business expenses 
under § 162, it is generally recognized that the provision applies 
or is at least “highly relevant” in determining whether a loss will 
be barred under § 165.80  As the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit observed, “Congress can hardly be 
considered to have intended to create a scheme where a payment 
would not pass muster under [§] 162(f), but would still qualify for 
deduction under [§] 165.”81  Assuming that to be the case, there 
78 Id. 
79 For a discussion of recent corporate settlements with the Government from 
companies in various industries for statutory and regulatory violations that total 
over $65 billion, see Abraham N.M. Shashy, Jr., Sara A. Silverstein & Ariana F. 
Wallizada, Beyond Frustration: Section 162(f) and the Deductibility of Fines, 
Penalties, and Settlement Payments, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 354–62 (2015). 
80 Stephens v. Comm’r, 905 F.2d 667, 672 (2d Cir. 1990); accord. Nacchio v. 
United States, 824 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Fines and similar penalties cannot be 
deducted under IRC § 212. See Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(p) (as amended in 1975). The 
legislative history accompanying the 1969 statute was ambiguous about whether 
courts might use public policy to deny deductions for business expenses that are not 
specifically disallowed by the statute. Although suggesting that § 162(c), (f), and (g) 
were intended to be an “all inclusive” list of public policy violations, the Senate’s 
summary of the bill also said, “Public policy, in other circumstances, generally is not 
sufficiently clearly defined to justify the disallowance of dedecution.” S. REP. NO. 91-
552, at 274 (1969) (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the Treasury Regulations have 
curtailed the courts’ ability to use public policy to further limit business expense 
deductions. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1993) (“A deduction for an 
expense paid or incurred after December 30, 1969, which would otherwise be 
allowable under [§] 162 shall not be denied on the grounds that allowance of such 
deduction would frustrate a sharply defined public policy.”); see also Note, The 
Judicial Public Policy Doctrine in Tax Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 131, 132–35 
(1975) (arguing that although not arbitrary, the Treasury’s view limiting the public 
policy doctrine to those codified by Congress was not mandated). 
81 Stephens, 905 F.2d at 672; accord Nacchio, 824 F.3d at 1375. Contra Ramos v. 
Comm’r., 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 924 (1981). The issue seems settled. The plaintiffs in 
Nacchio did not contest the applicability of § 162(f) but contended instead that the 
payments were compensatory and not a fine or similar penalty. See Brief of 
Plaintiffs in Opposition to the Motion of the United States for Summary Judgment 
and in Support of Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, 
Nacchio v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 195 (2013) (No. 12-20 T). The IRS takes the 
view that the public policy exception under § 165 is at least as broad as under 
§ 162(f). Rev. Rul. 77-126, 1977-1 C.B. 47; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2012-40-007 (Oct. 5, 
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are two pertinent issues:  Can payments to non-governmental 
entities be treated as fines and penalties, and what makes a 
legally imposed payment a “fine or similar penalty” as opposed to 
some other sort of payment? 
A. What Does “Paid to a Government” Mean? 
On its face, § 162(f) seems to require that only fines and 
penalties “paid to a government” are nondeductible.82  If that 
were so, then a payment to the thieves would not be included.  
Some courts have indeed read the words literally.83  However, 
other courts have held that payments to a nongovernmental 
entity can be classified as a fine or similar penalty, and thus are 
not deductible.84  For example, in Waldman v. Commissioner,85 
the United States Tax Court took a pragmatic approach, 
reasoning that even though the payment was made to the victims 
of the defendant’s grand theft, the State had complete control 
over the disposition of the funds.86  This liberal reading is 
warranted, since the reason for denying deductions for fines and 
similar penalties is to leave their sting in place.87  It should not 
matter, therefore, to whom these payments are made.  
Waldman’s reasoning is pertinent here.  The State, by foreclosing  
 
 
2012). In Holt v. Commissioner, the court disallowed a loss deduction on public 
policy grounds where the taxpayer’s truck and other property were forfeited because 
they were used to transport marijuana. 69 T.C. 75, 80 (1977), aff’d, 611 F.2d 1160 
(5th Cir. 1980). The court said that it did not need to consider § 162(f). Id. at 81. In 
Nacchio, the Government contended that § 162(f) applied to losses under § 165 by 
virtue of Treas. Reg. 1.165-1(a), which provides that a loss deduction “is subject to 
any provision of the Code that prohibits or limits [the] deduction.” 115 Fed. Cl. 195, 
202 (2013); Brief of the United States in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 19, Nacchio v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 195 (2013) (No. 12-20 T). 
82 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(f) (West 2014). 
83 Stephens, 905 F.2d at 674 (leaving open the possibility that the public policy 
exception under § 165 might be broader as compared to § 162(a)); Spitz v. United 
States, 432 F. Supp. 148, 150 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Allied-Signal Inc. v. Comm'r, 1995 
U.S. App. LEXIS 41283, at *27–28 (3d Cir. Feb. 23, 1995) (Nygaard, J. dissenting). 
84 E.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2672, at 46 (1992), aff’d, 
54 F.3d 767 (3d Cir. 1995); Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 298–99 (6th Cir. 
1993); Bailey v. Comm’r, 756 F.2d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 1985); Ginsburg v. Comm’r, 67 
T.C.M. (CCH) 3091 (1994). Similarly, the IRS has ruled that a charitable 
contribution paid in lieu of a fine is not deductible. Rev. Rul. 79-148, 1979-1 C.B. 93. 
85 88 T.C. 1384, 1389 (1987), aff’d, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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any chance for relief, controls the ultimate disposition of the 
stolen money and punishes the defrauded victims who otherwise 
satisfy the usual requirements for restitution. 
B. When Is a Payment a Fine or Similar Penalty? 
Not all court-ordered payments are fines or civil penalties.  
Even if paid due to a criminal conviction, the payment might be 
deemed to be compensation or restitution.  The Treasury 
Regulations provide in pertinent part: 
For purposes of this section a fine or similar penalty includes an 
amount— 
(i) Paid pursuant to conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere for a crime (felony or misdemeanor) in a criminal 
proceeding; 
(ii) Paid as a civil penalty imposed by Federal, State, or local 
law . . . ; 
(iii) Paid in settlement of the taxpayer’s actual or potential 
liability for a fine or penalty (civil or criminal); or 
(iv) Forfeited as collateral posted in connection with a 
proceeding which could result in imposition of such a fine or 
penalty. 
(2) . . . Compensatory damages (including damages under 
section 4A of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15a), as amended) paid 
to a government do not constitute a fine or penalty.88 
The regulation is helpful up to a point but leaves many 
unanswered questions.  For example, when a court orders a 
criminal defendant to reimburse a victim, is the payment made 
“pursuant to a conviction” or is it compensatory?  Unless the 
sentencing court specifically directs what the income tax 
consequences will be,89 it is impossible to describe the payment as 
being solely punitive or solely compensatory.  The payments 
compensate victims and often prevent defendants from being 
unjustly enriched but are also part of defendants’ criminal 
sentence.  Trying to determine whether the payment is a fine or 
compensation is like trying to decide whether light is a wave or a 
particle.  Some courts have determined that the payment was 
made for the purpose of rehabilitation and deterrence and was 
88 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b) (as amended in 1975). 
89 Cf. Bailey, 756 F.2d at 46–47 (finding that the sentencing court allowed the 
amount of the fine to be paid in restitution to the victims of the taxpayer’s fraud and 
directed that the funds should retain their status as civil penalties). 
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therefore a fine or similar penalty.90  Other courts have found the 
payment to be compensatory because the defendant’s sentence 
was severe in other respects.91 
The Internal Revenue Service considers multiple factors in 
determining whether a settlement payment is deductible.92  This 
90 Waldman, 88 T.C. at 1388 (holding that, under California law, restitution was 
for purpose of rehabilitation, deterrence and to enforce the law); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. 
Comm’r., 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2672 (1992) (concluding that compensatory or remedial 
purpose was minimal; payment to a 501(c)(4) fund was made with understanding 
that the fine would be reduced and was paid for punishment and deterrence), aff’d, 
54 F.3d 767 (3d Cir. 1995). Cf. Nacchio v. United States, 824 F.3d 1370, 1380–81 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that forfeiture was part of the penalty, but oddly reasoning 
in part that payment was not restitution because it was pegged to Nacchio’s profits 
and not to the victims’ losses); Ginsburg v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (CCH) 3091 (1994) 
(holding that the restitution payments to the county government constitute a fine). 
But see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2012-40-007 (July 11, 2012) (finding that, under New 
Jersey law, an order of restitution under a criminal sentence is primarily 
compensatory). 
91 E.g., Stephens v. Comm’r, 905 F.2d 667, 672–73 (2d Cir. 1990); Nacchio v. 
United States, 115 Fed Cl. 195, 202 (2014), rev’d on other grounds, 824 F.3d 1370, 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that Congress intended for forfeitures in this type of 
case to be paid with after-tax dollars); Spitz v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 148, 149–
50 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Cavaretta v. Comm’r., T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-004 (2010). The Israeli 
Supreme Court has recently adopted a similar approach. The panel unanimously 
concluded that the restitution of embezzled funds made in each of two cases before 
the court that occurred while the criminal trials were pending were compensatory. 
CA 4157/13 Damari v. Tax Assessor (2015), available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/13/570/041/t09/13041570.t09.pdf (Hebrew). Finding a 
lacuna in the tax statute, a majority of the panel allowed the taxpayers to offset half 
of the embezzled income that was earned in a prior year. 
92 In one instance, the IRS Chief Counsel advised area counsel to consider the 
origin and character of the liability giving rise to the payment, with the proviso that 
its advice may not be cited or used as precedent: 
If the law is designed to compensate the injured party for its damages, [§] 
162(f) is likely to be inapplicable. . . . If the law is designed to be punitive or 
to deter the type of conduct committed by the taxpayer, then the payment 
is likely covered by § 162(f). 
Chief Counsel Advisory, I.R.S. C.C.A. 201308027, 2013 WL 653294 (Feb. 22, 
2013) (emphasis added). It went on to say: 
In ascertaining the nature of a payment as punitive or compensatory, 
courts analyze the purpose of the statute requiring the payment or forming 
the basis of claims that are settled. Both the language of the statute and its 
legislative history are relevant to this inquiry. If a payment can serve both 
punitive and compensatory purposes, it is necessary to determine which 
purpose the particular payment serves. . . . A civil violation, even if it is 
labeled a penalty, may be deductible if imposed to encourage compliance 
with the law or as a remedial measure to compensate another party. 
Id. Finally the Chief Counsel advised, “[T]he express characterization of a 
settlement payment by the parties to a settlement agreement also must be 
considered.” Id. Authors of a recent study have concluded that at least 13 
factors need to be considered to determine the deductibility of a settlement 
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leaves taxpayers and regulators with limited ability to predict 
the outcome so that the burden of administering the regime is 
high, imposing additional costs on taxpayers regardless of 
whether they are allowed a deduction or not. 
In any event, the regulations teach that one must classify 
payments imposed by law as being either compensatory or 
punitive.  The states do not intend to compensate confidence 
schemes’ promoters by denying restitution to the victims.  
Denying restitution is rather a form of punishment inflicted on 
these victims, and it ought therefore to be treated as a civil 
penalty. 
Perhaps one would object that while fines and penalties are 
normally imposed by courts, the “penalty” involved in the denial 
of restitution is due solely to the courts’ inaction.  Although the 
distinction between act and failure to act can have significant 
legal consequences in other contexts,93 the situation here is 
different.  The defrauded party has met all of the usual 
requirements that courts impose for relief when one party has 
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another.  One rightfully 
expects the courts to act.  Their refusal to do so is knowing and 
willful to the point that one may conclude that the courts’ 
purpose is to make the defrauded party’s loss permanent.94  
Denial of restitution amounts to a forfeiture, and forfeitures are 
best seen as a type of fine or penalty.95  A tax deduction for the 
amount forfeited would mitigate its intended impact.  Even if the  
 
payment, including “the severity of the conduct giving rise to the investigation 
or charges, and the facts surrounding that conduct” and “the factual record of 
negotiations, and the language in the settlement agreement.” Shashy, supra 
note 79, at 405. 
93 For example, a stranger has no duty to act, but once a person acts, he must 
usually act with reasonable care. See, e.g., Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 
S.W.3d 347, 374–75 (Tenn. 2008). 
94 Cf. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 357 (“[E]ven though the specific negligent act 
may constitute an omission, the entirety of the conduct may still be misfeasance that 
created a risk of harm.”). 
95 See Wood v. United States, 863 F.2d 417, 418–19 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
although proceeds of drug smuggling were income to the taxpayer, public policy 
precluded a deduction under IRC § 165 when the proceeds were forfeited to the 
government because forfeitures are penalties); see also King v. United States, 152 
F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1998) (following Wood so as not to create a circuit split, but 
expressing uncertainty about its correctness). Cf. Kahn & Bromberg, supra note 37, 
at 212–13 (suggesting that it is possible to describe a forfeiture as a fine for purposes 
of § 162(f)). 
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defrauded taxpayer were to have difficulty locating the thief or 
his assets, a tax deduction would undermine the state’s policy 
that the theft loss be absolute and permanent. 
However, the matter is complicated because in 1980 the IRS 
ruled that punitive damages are deductible under § 162(a) if they 
otherwise satisfy the requirements of being ordinary and 
necessary business expenses.96  Punitive damages are intended to 
deter and punish the wrongdoer and often exceed the amount of 
any fine or civil penalty that might be leveled for the same 
conduct.97  That being the case, how can a court treat the denial 
of restitution to the victims of confidence schemes any 
differently—since they, too, are a form of punishment? 
One answer is that punitive damages ought to be 
nondeductible.98  The Revenue Ruling allowing deductions for 
96 Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 57. A similar analysis was presented in I.R.S. 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 79-23-006 (Feb. 27, 1979). 
97 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 584 (1996). Moreover, garden-
variety “compensatory” tort damages are not intended solely to make a victim whole. 
Such damages are designed in part to deter wrongdoing. See Kalavity v. United 
States, 584 F.2d 809, 811 (6th Cir. 1978); Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 
364 (Utah 1989). Further, damages for pain and suffering—the bulk of most 
damages for personal injury—rest on a fiction that money can compensate for 
noneconomic loss. See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374–75 (N.Y. 1989). 
Moreover, even though a tort victim might view compensatory damages for out-of-
pocket expenses as a form of corrective justice, from the defendant’s point of view, 
especially to one facing potentially catastrophic damages, the deterrent effect of 
ordinary tort damages looms largest. Id. 
98 For criticism of the current rule, see Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility 
of Punitive Damage Payments: Who Should Ultimately Bear the Burden for 
Corporate Misconduct?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 825, 826, 828 (1996); Catherine M. Del 
Castillo, Note, Should Punitive Damages Be Nondeductible? The Expansion of the 
Public-Policy Doctrine, 68 TEX. L. REV. 819, 820 (1990) (calling for Congressional 
reform but asserting that punitive damages do not fall within the literal terms of 
§ 162(f)); K. Todd Curry, Comment, The Deductibility of Punitive Damages as an 
Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense: Reviving the Public Policy Doctrine, 26 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 357, 358–59 (1989) (same); Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Developing a 
Theory of Damage Recovery Taxation, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 759, 787–89 (1988). 
The Treasury has proposed that Congress amend the Code to abolish the 
deductibility of punitive damages. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, General Explanations 
of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2015 Revenue Proposals (Mar. 2014), available 
at www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-
FY2015.pdf, at *101. Similar proposals were made as early as 2000. See STAFF OF J. 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS 
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET PROPOSAL 330–33 
(2011); See Shashy, supra note 79, at 401. For opposition to any change in the 
deductibility of punitive damages, see Robert W. Wood, Why Punitive Damages 
Should Remain Deductible, 124 TAX NOTES 149 (July 13, 2009). 
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punitive damages is short on reasoning and precedent.99  It may 
have been based in part on the idea that civil penalties must be 
“paid to a government,” and the punitive damages at issue in 
that Ruling were paid to a corporation.100  As we saw above, 
courts since 1980 have held that the “paid to a government” 
requirement does not require the government to pocket the 
money.101 
Another possibility is that punitive damages differ 
significantly from the penalty felt by confidence-scheme victims.  
As some have argued, deductions for punitive damages may be 
necessary because these damages are sometimes intended to 
partially compensate injured parties.102  Similarly, some have 
argued that deductions for punitive damages are appropriate 
because it can be difficult to know which portion of a tort 
settlement is really punitive.103  Neither of these arguments is of 
concern here because no part of the unrecovered stolen money is 
intended to compensate or otherwise benefit the thieves.  The 
denial of relief is entirely punitive. 
Finally, the public policy exception may be more limited 
under § 162 than it is for § 165.  The Revenue Ruling allowing a 
deduction for punitive damages emphasizes the legislative 
history of the 1969 Act confining public policy exceptions to those 
specified in § 162.  Arguably, a broader use of public policy 
99 The Ruling relied on the legislative history of the 1969, saying that the 
additions made to § 162 making certain items nondeductible were all inclusive. Rev. 
Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 57. The Ruling did not explain why punitive damages were 
not penalties. None of the authorities cited discussed punitive damages. Rev. Rul. 
78-210 concerned payment of medical malpractice judgments and settlements and 
related legal fees and costs. Rev. Rul. 78-210, 1978-1 C.B. 39. Rev. Rul. 69-491 
concerned a bank’s payment of insurance premiums to cover its officers and 
directors. Rev. Rul. 69-491, 1969-2 C.B. 22; see also Kornhauser v. United States, 
276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928) (allowing deductions for legal expenses incurred in the 
successful defense of a suit by a former partner for an accounting); Mulgrew 
Blacktop, Inc. v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Iowa 1969) (allowing 
deductions for amounts paid in settlement of a personal injury claim arising out of 
an employee’s use of the taxpayer’s automobile and for associated legal fees); 
Cochrane v. Comm’r, 23 B.T.A. 202, 208 (1931) (allowing a deduction for an amount 
paid by an attorney for not adequately protecting a client’s interest). 
100 The Ruling mentioned that Congress included “fines or similar penalties paid 
to a government” among the items that may not be deducted. Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-
2 C.B. 57. 
101 See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
102 Wood, supra note 92, at 151–52. 
103 W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. OF 
LEGAL STUD. 313, 342–43 (2001). 
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exemptions is justified with respect to § 165.  A deduction under 
§ 162 ensures that tax is imposed on net income, not gross 
receipts.104  A public policy exception interferes with this goal.  
This is not an issue with respect to deductions for theft losses 
under § 165(c)(3).  A deduction for those losses only recognizes 
that the taxpayer has less wealth and therefore less ability to pay 
tax.105 
As suggested above, one can argue that denying a deduction 
to people like Mazzei is justified so as not to frustrate the states’ 
goal of punishing them for their criminal or immoral conduct by 
denying them the right of obtaining restitution.  However, 
denying restitution to the defrauded investor in a confidence 
scheme seems harsh.  It is for Congress and the state legislatures 
to criminalize possession of counterfeit money and the attempt to 
purchase counterfeit money.  Unless the legislature so directs, 
the courts should not impose forfeiture of the invested dollars as 
an additional penalty.106  Moreover, the states’ policy regarding 
restitution involving illegal contracts is subject to change.  As 
noted by the Restatement: 
The range of misconduct for which claimants have historically 
been subject to equitable disqualification is both vast and 
intricately qualified, because the judicial power to bar a claim 
on equitable grounds is essentially exercised ad hoc. The 
present scope of this barrier to restitution appears to be 
narrowing somewhat, as courts become less inclined to enforce a 
moral judgment with civil penalties, or to add an extra- 
 
 
104 See Comm’r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 692 (1966). 
105 See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 13, at 315 (explaining that Congress granted 
loss deduction for casualty and theft losses to reflect decline in ability to pay). The 
allowance of a theft loss deduction is a departure from the Code’s disallowance of 
deductions for personal consumption expenses. IRC § 262(a) (2012); see MARVIN A. 
CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 205 (13th ed. 
2015). Congress allows these deductions only to the extent they exceed in the 
aggregate more than ten percent of a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. 
26 U.S.C.A. § 165(h)(2) (West 2014). No deduction is allowed for the first $100 of 
loss. Id. But see Robert W. Wood, Denying Deductions Based on Public Policy, 110 
Tax Notes 1415, 1420 (Mar. 27, 2006) (arguing that use of public policy exceptions 
under § 165 “circumvents the all-inclusive nature of the congressional changes” 
made in 1969). 
106 This may be compared to civil forfeiture, which is only by statute. See, e.g., 
21 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-28-5.04.2 (West 2015); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 69.50.505 (West 2015); see generally 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures § 9 (2015). 
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statutory penalty—in the form of forfeiture of a restitution 
claim—for conduct that the law already punishes by other 
means.107 
Israeli and New Zealand statutes allow parties to an illegal 
contract the right to obtain restitution, but reserve to the court 
the discretion to deny it.108  Other countries are considering 
reforms.109  The Israeli legislation was based in part on Jewish 
law, which generally upholds the validity of contracts made in 
violation of the law unless there is a pressing need to take 
protective measures.110  Jewish law imposes penalties for the 
criminal acts and requires repentance for the religious 
violations.111  In discussing a confidence scheme involving a 
107 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 32 cmt. 
d. (AM. LAW INST. 2011); see also id. § 63 cmt. a (“[T]he reach of equitable 
disqualification must inevitably be open to question, since punishment by forfeiture 
requires the court to tolerate an unjustified enrichment that the law normally 
condemns.”). 
108 Israeli legislation allows for restitution of benefits conferred under an illegal 
contract “except to the extent that the court determines that justice requires 
otherwise.” 4 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW, HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES at 
1716–17 (1994); see also Daniel Friedmann, Consequences of Illegality Under the 
Israeli Contract Law (General Part) 1973, 33 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 81, 81 (1984); 
Illegal Contracts Act 1970, s 7(1), (3) (N.Z.) (granting discretion to the court to 
provide relief, including restitution, but providing that it “shall not grant relief if it 
considers that to do so would not be in the public interest”). 
109 See BRITISH COLUMBIA LAW INSTITUTE, BCLI REPORT; NO. 52, REPORT ON 
RELIEF UNDER LEGALLY DEFECTIVE CONTRACTS: THE UNIFORM ILLEGAL CONTRACTS 
ACT (2008), available at http://www.bcli.org/sites/default/files/legally_ 
defective_contracts_relief.pdf (discussing Canada’s proposed uniform statute); 
SINGAPORE’S LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, RELIEF FROM UNENFORCEABILITY OF 
ILLEGAL CONTRACTS AND TRUSTS (2002), available at http://www.commonlii.org/ 
sg/other/SGLRC/report/R9/9.pdf. In England and Wales, the Law Commission has 
recommended that reforms should be made through the common law based on a 
variety of factors and concluding, “Only when depriving the claimant of his or her 
rights is a proportionate response based on the relevant illegality policies, should the 
[illegality] defence succeed.” THE LAW COMMISSION, THE ILLEGALITY DEFENCE, 
CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 189 at 147 (2009), available at 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/cp189_Illegality_Defence_Co 
nsultation.pdf; see also THE LAW COMMISSION, THE ILLEGALITY DEFENCE, LAW COM 
NO. 320 (2010), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/229171/0412.pdf (final report to Parliament). 
110 See 5 MENACHEM ELON, Contract, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 189, 193–94 
(2d ed. 2007); RABBI JACOB REISCHER, REPSONSA SHEVUT YA’AKOV 1:145, translated 
in JEWISH LAW (MISHPAT IVRI): CASES AND MATERIALS 114–15 (MENACHEM ELON, 
BERNARD AUERBACH, DANIEL D. CHAZIN & MELVIN J. SYKES, 1999). 
111 In Jewish law, agreements to sell and formal acquisitions made on the 
Sabbath, festivals or Yom Kippur, are valid even if part of the performance involves 
a violation of Torah law. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 235:28; Hilkhot 
Mechirah 30:7 (Hebrew), in CODE OF MAIMONIDES (Eliyahu Touger trans. Moznaim 
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purchase of counterfeit money and a staged “police” raid, a 
contemporary rabbi wrote that a rabbinic court should unwind 
the transaction and give each side back its “money.”112 
III. REASSESSING THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE IN  
INCOME TAX CASES 
This article has proposed that cases like Mazzei can best be 
understood as being consistent with state law that in effect 
imposes a penalty on defrauded taxpayers who participate in 
illegal schemes by denying them restitution, and that it would 
violate state policy to allow the taxpayer a deduction for a loss.  
What if states adopted an approach more like that of Israel or 
New Zealand, allowing in most cases the defrauded taxpayer 
party restitution and punishing him criminally for attempt to 
commit a crime and for conspiracy?  If this approach was taken, 
the case for denying a deduction would be considerably 
weakened.  Of course, if in the year of the loss the thieves could 
be found and if there was a reasonable prospect that they would 
make restitution, no deduction would be possible.113  But in other 
instances, the change in state law would remove the conflict 
between the tax code’s grant of a theft deduction and state policy. 
Publications). The participants in such transactions are flogged, but the sales 
agreement can be written later. The Jewish courts can as protective measure require 
that any profit made on the sale be donated to the poor. Rabbeinu Gershom ben 
Judah (circa 960-1040), Responsa 9 (Hebrew). By contrast, in those states that 
enforced Sunday closing laws, courts would dismiss suits for breach of contract if the 
contract were made on a Sunday. E.g., Patton v. Graves, 224 A.2d 411, 416 (Md. 
1966) (holding that an executory contract for the sale of real estate made on a 
Sunday is unenforceable). Many courts have even denied restitution of money paid 
or goods delivered. See PALMER, supra note 62, at 175 (collecting cases); e.g., 
Foreman v. Ahl, 55 Pa. 325, 331 (1867) (holding that the sale of mules finalized on a 
Sunday is in violation of divine law and state statute and thus, is void). 
112 Rabbi Yitzhak Zilberstein, CHASHUKEI CHEMED, Makkot 142 (Hebrew). The 
incident in question occurred much earlier, having been told by Rabbi Yosef Yozel 
Horwitz, the Sabba (old man) of Novardok (1847–1919). Id. at 143 n.19. Rabbi 
Zilberstein wrote: 
If the court thinks it proper to punish the counterfeiters so that they do not 
continue to deceive the public, then they may do so and leave the money 
with the purchaser. However, it must be investigated whether the money 
should be left with him since he was a swindler like them, and might be 
enabled to cheat others with the counterfeit money. 
Id. It is hard to understand why the counterfeit money should be returned to either 
party since it can only be used to harm the public. 
113 See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(3). 
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Indeed, there seems little justification for the blanket rule of 
American law denying restitution to the defrauded parties.  The 
victims are subject to prosecution for their wrongdoing and there 
is no need to punish them further.  Moreover, by denying 
restitution, the courts inflict a punishment that is based solely on 
the amount of money invested.  The greater the investor’s loss, 
the greater the punishment, regardless of the harm that the 
investor intended to cause.114  Further, denying restitution allows 
a windfall to the thief who is likely no less culpable than the 
victim. 
One might argue that even if state law were changed to 
allow restitution, it is another matter to permit a tax deduction 
to someone who attempted to purchase counterfeit money, 
shifting part of the loss onto the Government and innocent 
American taxpayers.  However, it has been the long-held view 
that the income tax system ought to be neutral in allowing 
deductions for illegal or immoral activities, unless Congress 
otherwise directs.115  In rejecting a 1913 amendment that would 
have limited deductions to those “incurred . . . in the pursuit of 
any ordinary and legitimate trade or business,” Senator 
Williams, who was in charge of the bill, replied, “In other words, 
you are going to count the man as having money which he has 
not got, because he has lost it in a way that you do not approve 
of.”116  The Code’s goal is “not to reform men’s moral 
characters” . . . [but to tax their] net income, [their] actual profit 
during the year.”117  The criminal law ought to suffice to punish 
wrongdoers.  Although the current Internal Revenue Code  
 
 
 
 
114 For example, if victim A invests $2,500 in the expectation of buying $25,000 
worth of counterfeit money, and victim B invests $5,000 expecting to buy $7,500 of 
fake money, denying restitution punishes B more seriously than A even though A 
sought to do more harm to the public. Cf. Kahn and Bromberg, supra note 37, at 
219–21 (illustrating examples of perverse results caused by denying a deduction for 
illegal expenses). 
115 David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing: Business Deductions in a Net Income 
Tax System, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1259 (2011). 
116 50 CONG. REC. 3,850 (1913). 
117 Id. at 3,849; see Comm’r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691–92 (1966). 
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deviates from Senator Williams’s idea in many respects,118 if it is 
thought that additional punishment in the form of a higher tax is 
necessary, it ought to be imposed by Congress, not the courts. 
One might argue that people like Mazzei suffered losses 
through their own recklessness and should be denied a deduction 
on that ground.  The Treasury Regulations provide that willful 
acts and even willful negligence are indeed grounds for denying a 
casualty loss deduction.119  However, these regulations specify 
that they are not applicable to theft deductions.120  There is 
reason for the distinction.  By its nature, a casualty loss must be 
unexpected,121 and if the taxpayer is seriously negligent or 
reckless in exposing property to a storm or fire, the loss is not 
unexpected.122  But thefts often occur when taxpayers are 
seriously careless.123  If a change is due here, it ought to be made 
by Congress. 
When judges override a statute and deny deductions on 
public policy grounds, they sometimes condemn the taxpayer’s 
conduct in strong moral terms.  For example, Mazzei was trying 
to commit a “serious crime” of counterfeiting.124  A client facing 
prosecution was “impenitent” for engaging a lawyer in an 
unsuccessful defense.125  As shown by Tellier, such moral 
judgments can induce courts to impose unduly harsh sanctions.126  
Mazzei did not counterfeit any money; guilty parties have a 
constitutional right to have lawyer.  In tort law, some courts have 
denied recovery to victims of negligence if they were engaged in 
illegal activity even though the state had a statutory rule of 
118 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(c) (West 2014) (disallowing deductions for certain illegal 
payments is the most obvious example); see generally Kahn and Bromberg, supra 
note 37. There are many others where Congress limits deductions for expenses 
related to the production of income—for example, business expenses must be 
ordinary and necessary—or allows deductions for expenses unrelated to the 
production of income—for example, charitable contributions. 
119 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(3)(i) (1977). 
120 Id. § 1.165-7(a)(6). 
121 Rev. Rul. 72-592, 1972-2 C.B. 101 
122 See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(3)(i) (stating no deduction if loss is due to willful 
act or willful negligence). 
123 See Ginesky v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1122 (1994); Nichols v. Comm’r, 43 
T.C. 842, 886 (1965). 
124 Mazzei v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 497, 504 (1974) (Tannenwald, J., concurring). 
125 Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Comm’r, 175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1949). 
126 See generally Comm’r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966). 
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comparative fault.127  Some have denied recovery to a child 
engaged in illegal activity even though under state law, the child 
might not have been negligent.128  In other areas of the law as 
well, courts have overridden statutory rights based on their 
moral condemnation of a party’s actions only to recognize later 
that their decisions are improper.129 
127 E.g., Reno v. D’Javid, 369 N.E.2d. 766 (N.Y. 1977) (dismissing claim for 
medical malpractice for injuries caused during abortion at a time when abortion was 
illegal); Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984) (affirming summary judgment 
dismissing a complaint against a 9-year-old who sold the firecrackers from which 
gunpowder was extracted and used to construct a pipe bomb). The courts made these 
determinations despite a New York statute at that time: 
In any action to recover damages for personal injury . . . the culpable 
conduct attributable to the claimant . . . including contributory negligence 
or assumption of risk, shall not bar recovery, but the amount of damages 
otherwise recoverable shall be diminished in the proportion which the 
culpable conduct attributable to the claimant . . . bears to the culpable 
conduct which caused the damages. 
See Flanagan v. Baker, 621 N.E.2d 1190, 1194 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). In Barker, 
the court said that the rule “rests . . . upon the public policy consideration that the 
courts should not lend assistance to one who seeks compensation under the law for 
injuries resulting from his own acts when they involve a substantial violation of the 
law.” 468 N.E.2d 39, 63 N.Y.2d at 29. Similar reasoning is used to bar claims for 
restitution by those engaged in illegal or immoral conduct. See supra text 
accompanying note 67. But see generally Dugger v. Arrendondo, 408 S.W.3d 825 
(Tex. 2013) (overruling unlawful acts doctrine). 
128 E.g., Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Decatur, Inc., 621 So. 2d 953, 954−55 
(Ala. 1993) (affirming summary judgment for the defendant in which a 14-year old 
child was killed while attempting to steal soft drinks from machine which tipped 
over and crushed him; it was not shown that the child was guilty of contributory 
negligence as this would involve an examination of the child’s ability to understand 
the risk involved); see generally Joseph H. King, Jr., Outlaws and Outlier Doctrines: 
The Serious Misconduct Bar in Tort Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1023–24 
(2002). 
129 For example, many American courts have followed a rule denying an ocean 
carrier the statutory right to limit liability if it committed an intentional deviation 
either by departing from the agreed route or by committing some other breach 
deemed to be fundamental, even though the statute allows a carrier to limit its 
liability “in any event.” 46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5) (2000); see Gen. Elec. Co. Int’l Sales 
Div. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 706 F.2d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 1983); Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 
116 F. Supp. 386, 389−90 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Some judges applying this doctrine have 
shown moral outrage at deviating carriers, even treating the carrier as having 
converted the goods. Compare The Citta Di Messina, 169 F. 472, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) 
(finding that shipper has “a right . . . to rescind the contract of shipment and treat 
the goods as converted”) (Hough, J.), with The Cabo Villano, 18 F.2d 220, 220 (2d 
Cir. 1927) (“To denounce the carrier's act or omission [wrongful delivery of goods] as 
a conversation is probably accurate in terms of common law, but in the admiralty is 
only calling bad names.”) (Hough, J.). More recently, even as courts have recognized 
that the deviation doctrine conflicts with the statute and will not be extended by 
analogy to arguably more serious breaches, they have continued to apply it to 
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These examples support the long-held view that reliance on 
public policy to override general principles of law is a risky 
business.130  This is all the more so when courts override a 
statutory directive.  Courts properly use public policy when 
interpreting statutes, and the line between interpretation and 
judicial use of public policy to override a statute is not always 
clear.  For example, the courts’ determination that fines and 
similar penalties cannot be deducted as losses under § 165 seems 
correct131 and can be seen both as an interpretation of 
congressional intent and as judicial law making.  Although 
Congress must be aware that tax law has always involved a 
significant degree of judicial law making,132 the regulations 
curtail the use of public policy for business expenses to those 
stated in the statute.133  As suggested above, deductions for theft 
losses stand on a different footing,134 and neither the Code nor 
the regulations prevent the courts from using public policy to 
limit them.  But courts should be cautious about adopting 
exceptions to loss deductions when not supported by policies 
founded on state or federal law. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Mazzei is often used to show that courts can 
disallow loss deductions on public policy grounds,135 its rationale 
for denying a theft loss deduction is far-fetched, as it is unlikely 
that a deduction would encourage counterfeiting.  Mazzei was 
geographical deviations and wrongful carriage on deck, asserting that the rule “is 
easy to administer and carriers know the risks.” Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc. v. 
SS John Weyerhaeuser, 507 F.2d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1974) (declining to apply the 
deviation doctrine to a carrier’s gross negligence in supplying a seaworthy vessel). 
See also B.M.A. Indus., LTD. v. Nigerian Star Line, LTD., 786 F.2d 90, 90 (2d Cir. 
1986) (declining to apply the deviation doctrine to criminal misdelivery of cargo). 
130 See, e.g., Feld & Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, 458 A.2d 545, 550 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1983) (quoting Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 130 Eng.Rep. 294, 303). 
131 See supra text accompanying note 81. 
132 But cf. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306–07 (1967) (“But we do not 
sit as a committee of revision to perfect the administration of the tax laws. Congress 
has delegated to the Commissioner, not to the courts, the task of prescribing ‘all 
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement’ of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 
U.S.C. [§] 7805(a). In this area of limitless factual variations ‘it is the province of 
Congress and the Commissioner, not the courts, to make the appropriate 
adjustments.’ ”). 
133 Stephens v. Comm’r, 905 F.2d 667, 672 (2d Cir. 1990). 
134 See supra text accompanying note 105. 
135 See generally Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956). 
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also unable to distinguish Bromberg.  Nonetheless, one can 
support the results in both of these cases by recognizing that a 
tax deduction for theft is inappropriate when it subverts a state’s 
punitive policy of denying restitution to confidence-scheme 
victims.  This was true in Mazzei but not in Bromberg.  However, 
should the states modify the law of restitution so as not to 
unjustly punish theft victims, the tax consequences ought to 
change, too. 
